

## CHAPTER 12

### **Practical Steps for Addressing the Problem of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons**

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This chapter outlines a number of steps one could take to try to move the arms control process forward with respect to non-strategic nuclear weapons (what I refer to out of habit as tactical nuclear weapons or TNW). These recommendations are based on two key assumptions: (1) there is a real threat posed to U.S. national security by Russian TNW; and (2) the threat is likely to increase significantly in the future due to the fragility of the informal 1991/92 TNW arms control regime and because of the growing pressure in Russia to modernize its TNW force. I do not think the conference upon which this book is based adequately came to grips with the nature of the threat for which my practical steps are supposed to cope.

In this chapter I begin by making the case for the immediacy of the Russian TNW threat and the inadequacy of the current, informal TNW regime. I then review the recent, post-Helsinki history of TNW deliberations between the United States and Russia. I make four basic points that will include a number of practical recommendations for advancing the TNW arms control process: (1) transparency measures should be pursued, but not within the context of the next Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III); (2) the principal, immediate objective for formal negotiations in the realm of TNW should be codification of the 1991/92 parallel, unilateral declarations; (3) withdrawal of U.S. TNW in Europe may be a useful catalyst to jump-start such negotiations, but it is mistaken to assume, as have most of the previous chapters, that this is the most important concern for Russian arms control policymakers; and (4) there may be several useful ways to pursue Lewis Dunn's notion of a "mix and match" strategy by expanding the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to include TNW dismantlement and by seeking to make TNW an issue in the context of the NPT Review Process.

### **The Nature of the Threat**

Tactical nuclear weapons are the category of American and Russian nuclear arsenals least regulated by arms control agreements. They are only subject to an informal regime created by unilateral, parallel declarations made by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in the autumn of 1991, the latter of which subsequently was affirmed and expanded upon by Boris Yeltsin in January 1992. Since then, TNW have not figured prominently in the bilateral United States-Russian arms control and disarmament agenda.

This lack of attention to TNW is unfortunate and dangerous given their large number, the risks of early and/or unauthorized use, and their vulnerability to theft. The regime itself is increasingly precarious since it is not legally binding, does not provide for data exchanges, and lacks a verification mechanism. As such, it is poorly equipped to withstand increasing challenges, such as the deterioration in US-Russian political relations; the growing skepticism in both countries about the role of arms control treaties in providing for their national security; the revival of interest in TNW in both Russia and, to a lesser extent, in the United States; growing pressure in Russia to re-manufacture and/or modernize its TNW force as the existing stocks near the end of their service life; and finally, the renewed interest in TNW in South Asia following the nuclear detonations by India and Pakistan in 1998.

The dangers of TNW relate to their physical properties and the policies for their deployment and employment. More specifically, these threats include:

- *Vulnerability to theft and unauthorized use.* The relatively small size of TNW and the absence among older warhead generations of electronic locks or Permissive Action Links (PALs) make them more attractive targets for theft than warheads for strategic delivery vehicles. TNW also are often stored separately from their delivery vehicles, which may be dual-use and thus are more susceptible to theft than their

strategic counterparts, which are more likely to be “mated” to missile delivery systems.

- *Forward-basing.* The intended use of TNW in battlefield and theater-level operations encourages their forward-deployment, especially during international crises. This forward-basing increases the risk of the weapons’ use at an early stage of a conflict and may actually provoke a preemptive strike by the other side.
- *Pre-delegation of launch authority.* An orientation toward the employment of TNW in conjunction with conventional forces and a concern about their survivability argues for the pre-delegation of launch authority to lower level commanders in the theater, especially once hostilities commence. This might result in diminished control by the political leadership over TNW.
- *Trends in modernization.* Nuclear weapons designers in both the United States and Russia display increasing enthusiasm for creating new, low or variable yield nuclear warheads. Low yield warheads for deployment as TNW are perceived as more usable in a broad range of conflict scenarios, a development that would lower the nuclear threshold. These pressures will be hard to resist as long as TNW exist.
- *Attractiveness to potential proliferators.* In addition to their relatively small size, TNW are attractive to potential proliferators because of the dual-use nature of many of their delivery systems. These systems tend to be much more readily available on the international market than are those for strategic weapons.
- *Russian safeguards.* In Russia, the security of TNW also is compromised by the lack of adequate storage facilities to handle the influx of warheads pending elimination and by the continuing turmoil, economic hardship, and general malaise within the armed forces. TNW for aircraft pose special risks since they are not kept at central storage sites and are supposed to be available for rapid deployment. A potentially serious but under-appreciated security problem involves the growing number of retired officers who previously guarded nuclear weapon sites. Many of these individuals continue to live within the storage site’s outer

perimeter since they are entitled to housing by law, even though they work elsewhere. There have been cases in which such retirees have assisted local criminal elements to penetrate several layers of security at nuclear storage sites, although the target of these activities appear to have been conventional rather than nuclear arms.

### **The Parallel Unilateral Declarations**

The aforementioned properties of TNW, policies for their deployment and use, and the peculiarities of the current Russian domestic scene, increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and reduce strategic stability. Moreover, to the extent that the two leading nuclear powers appear to consider these weapons essential and “usable,” others may well emulate their example.

These risks were only partially addressed by the 1991/92 parallel unilateral declarations on TNW. These parallel declarations provided for the elimination of the entire U.S. world-wide inventory of ground-launched theater nuclear weapons; the removal of all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. surface ships and submarines, as well as nuclear bombs aboard aircraft carriers; the dismantling and destruction of many of these warheads, and the securing of the remainder in central storage areas in the United States. The Soviet Union, in turn, pledged (and Russia subsequently reaffirmed) its intent to eliminate all nuclear warheads on land-based tactical missiles, as well as nuclear artillery munitions and mines; to withdraw nuclear warheads for air defense systems and to store them at central bases, to remove all tactical weapons from surface ships, submarine, and land-based naval aviation; and to secure those TNW that were not eliminated at central storage sites in Russia. The redeployment in central storage and/or elimination of TNW as a function of the 1991/92 parallel unilateral declarations measured in the thousands of nuclear charges. As a disarmament measure these steps surpassed all the negotiated agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia.

Notwithstanding the significant accomplishments of the parallel, unilateral declarations, the informal regime suffers from a number of serious deficiencies:

- Unilateral statements are not legally binding. They can be disavowed without prior notification.
- The parallel, unilateral declarations do not provide a mechanism for their mutual modification.
- The 1991/92 informal regime does not provide for data exchange or any verification and transparency measures. It is, therefore, impossible to have confidence in the implementation of the declarations and to ascertain the status of the remaining TNW.
- Reductions under the unilateral statements were conceived in terms of the percentage of the arsenal rather than with respect to agreed ceilings. No reference was made to the total number of TNW at the time of the statements and there is no indication of the numbers to be reduced. Neither the United States nor Russia has released official public information regarding the number or location of their TNW.

#### **Recent Developments Regarding the Reduction of TNW**

Neither Russia nor the United States paid much attention to TNW arms control and disarmament following the 1991/92 declarations. The United States made no serious effort to supplement the informal regime, and Russia preferred to ignore the issue of further TNW controls. The international community, with the notable exceptions of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Kyrgyzstan, also remained silent until very recently about the risks posed by TNW and the need for further reductions and/or legally binding agreements replete with verification provisions. Indeed, efforts by Sweden and Norway in 1996 to generate international support for codifying the existing declarations into a legally binding treaty generated no response from the United States, Russia, or other countries, and as late as 1997 only Finland and Kyrgyzstan had raised the issue of TNW arms control and disarmament in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) forum.

The issue of TNW did not resurface on the U.S.-Russian arms control agenda until 1997. During a Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Helsinki, Russia proposed that START III should address sea-launched cruise missiles. The United States responded with a counterproposal to simultaneously address all TNW. There were then several rounds of consultations in 1997 and 1998 about the future of START III in which both sides entertained the possibility of creating a single limit on all of their nuclear weapons that would combine both strategic and tactical warheads.

In early 2000 the United States tabled a draft of START III, whose transparency provisions explicitly covered warheads for non-strategic delivery vehicles. Russia, in turn, incorporated in its START III proposal an element from its position in the late 1960s, which called for the application of the treaty's coverage to all nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of the other side (including, obviously, U.S. TNW in Europe). Since then, neither side has responded positively to the proposal of the other. Although there appears to be little prospect in the near-term for progress in addressing TNW within the strategic arms control negotiating arena, shortly after the conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference the United States did formally propose to Russia to reaffirm the 1991 parallel declarations. Russia did not respond directly to that proposal, but reiterated its position that the United States withdraw its TNW from Europe.

### **Practical Steps for Advancing TNW Arms Control**

#### *Transparency Measures*

In Chapter 5 Bob Gromoll and Dunbar Lockwood make the case for pursuing an approach to negotiated TNW arms control that emphasizes transparency measures. I agree that it makes sense to focus on TNW transparency because the 1991/92 informal regime has no provisions for data exchanges or verification. Given the wide range of estimates about Russian TNW (see Appendix One for alternative figures), it would be very useful to exchange data on the number of TNW stocks by category (i.e., deployed, reserve/long-term storage, slated for elimination). It

also would be useful to exchange data on the pace of TNW reductions since 1991 and the distribution of remaining TNW by region.

Where I disagree with the current U.S. approach to TNW arms control is the attempt to link TNW transparency to the START process. Even if one is very optimistic and assumes that there is some prospect for movement in START III with respect to strategic nuclear weapons, I cannot imagine any progress being made if one burdens an already halting process with the problem of TNW transparency. In fact, it is the transparency provisions of the current U.S. proposal that Moscow finds most objectionable.

How then might one proceed? One approach would be to initiate a separate negotiation on TNW that is not linked to START III.

*Formalization of the 1991/92 Declarations.*

A separate negotiation on TNW should have as its principal objective codification or formalization of the 1991/92 parallel unilateral declarations. At the initial stage, formalization of the informal TNW regime would only require conversion of the existing texts of the relevant unilateral statements into legally binding language. Data exchange on TNW also could be included. These steps could be accomplished in the form of an executive agreement. The immediate arms control objective would be to solidify those TNW reductions already accomplished. At a later stage, the more difficult task of negotiating verification measures and possible deeper reductions could be undertaken.

A variant of this proposal, which might be more attractive to Moscow, would be to revise partially the coverage of the 1991 regime in a codified, legally-binding fashion. More specifically, Russia probably would prefer the option to deploy a limited number of land-based or sea-based TNW at the expense of air-based TNW.

*Additional Unilateral Initiatives*

I am not a great fan of unilateral initiatives, which can be disavowed almost as readily as they are pronounced. The new U.S. administration, however, should seriously review the political rationale for continued deployment of TNW in Europe and contemplate their unilateral removal.

It is hard to believe that after 50 years of cooperation it is the presence of a few hundred TNW in Europe—a military force for which there is no military mission—that remains the glue of the alliance.<sup>2</sup> In short, it is time to rethink first principles and to do so at the highest political level. The arguments often expressed in this book, that one should forego such reassessment because TNW arms control will weaken NATO and/or deprive the United States of its principal “bargaining chip” vis à vis Russia, are unpersuasive.

First, it should be noted that a number of NATO states recently have been among the most forceful advocates of further TNW reductions. The so-called “NATO-5,” for example, were leading proponents of TNW disarmament at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.<sup>3</sup> Among them, Norway was especially effective in making the case for negotiated and verifiable TNW reductions.<sup>4</sup> Portugal, on behalf of the European Union (EU), also specifically underlined the importance the EU attached to “addressing non-strategic nuclear weapons in the framework of nuclear arms reduction efforts” and urged “the Review Conference to encourage the Nuclear Weapon States which possess such weapons, and in the first instance the United States and Russia, to explore ways to bring those weapons within future nuclear reduction and disarmament arrangements, with *the objective of their reduction and eventual complete elimination.*”<sup>5</sup> Canada occasionally has been even more direct in calling for unilateral action by NATO in this regard, as evident in Lloyd Axworthy’s May 2000 address to the North Atlantic Council meeting in Florence. The Canadian Foreign Minister asked:

Can we not be more transparent about how many nuclear gravity bombs we have left, and where they are located? Can NATO not unilaterally reduce the

number of remaining bombs further, and call for a proportional parallel action by the Russian Federation? Could we not take these sorts of measures to increase confidence with others, especially Russia, in order to pave the way for greater Russian openness on their huge sub-strategic stockpiles? Could we not encourage a codification of the 1991-1992 Russia-U.S. commitments regarding the reduction and dismantlement of sub-strategic weapons?<sup>6</sup>

These and other recent pronouncements indicate that very senior officials in many NATO states not only do not fear that a reassessment of TNW policy will lead the U.S. to disengage from Europe—the so-called “slippery slope of disengagement”—but indeed view TNW arms control and disarmament as a means to strengthen NATO and their own countries’ security.

Just as opponents of TNW reductions in Europe exaggerate opposition to the idea on the part of policymakers in NATO states, they also overestimate the significance Russian officials attach to the small number of TNW that remain in Europe. Although these weapons have considerable symbolic importance and their removal could make it easier for Moscow to accept negotiations on TNW transparency and/or codification of the informal regime, they are not regarded by Russian officials as posing a serious military threat or providing NATO with a significant bargaining chip. Indeed, they are of much less concern than are some advanced conventional weapons in Europe, especially long-range SLCMs.

Finally, it is worth reiterating that one should not equate TNW arms control with going to zero in Europe. Although the withdrawal of U.S. TNW from Europe might be a useful means to jump-start TNW negotiations with Russia, the most important immediate objective should be to codify the 1991/92 parallel, unilateral declarations. That significant

accomplishment would not necessarily entail further TNW reductions.

*Mix and Match Approach*

Lewis Dunn has suggested that one may be able to reinforce the informal TNW regime by selectively supporting a variety of related activities outside of the formal U.S.-Russian arms control negotiation arena. Perhaps the best example of such an approach, also noted by Linton Brooks, would be to expand the activities of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to include the protection and dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons.

CTR funds currently are not designated to assist the safeguarding and dismantlement of TNW in Russia, although that objective is not inconsistent with the goals of the original Nunn-Lugar program. Among the potential gains from an expansion of the CTR mandate would be accelerating the process of securing TNW and their consolidation at fewer facilities, accelerating the pace of TNW dismantlement, greater likelihood of Russian receptivity to further arms reductions involving TNW, increased transparency (a part of the CTR process) for TNW dismantlement, and more safeguards for the fissile material byproducts of the dismantlement process. Given the growing interest on the part of a number of countries in TNW disarmament, it would be highly desirable for other states to join the United States in this expanded CTR effort.

Another arena in which U.S. action could usefully reinforce the informal TNW regime is the NPT Review Process. A broad and diverse group of NPT states parties now supports further reductions of TNW, a new development reflected in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Although the Russian Federation was able to weaken substantially the language of the declaration, it nevertheless stipulates that nuclear weapon states will take steps “in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all” toward “the further reduction of non-strategic weapons, based on unilateral

initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.”<sup>7</sup> The 2000 NPT Review Conference declaration is the first time an NPT review conference agreed upon language regarding TNW disarmament, a development that should make it easier in the future to utilize the review process to promote stronger language on negotiated and verifiable TNW reductions. U.S. support for that objective would likely be endorsed by the overwhelming majority of NPT states parties.

### **Priority Measures**

The current, informal TNW regime, one of the most significant arms control and disarmament accomplishments of the 1990s, is particularly vulnerable to the impact of both new Russian thinking about nuclear weapons and possible U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. A high priority should be given to reinforcing the regime and erecting a retaining wall to prevent its erosion and collapse.

Among the most important steps that should be taken are (1) the reaffirmation by the United States and Russia in a joint statement of their continued commitment to the 1991 parallel, unilateral statements, or (preferably) (2) signing an executive agreement to that effect. Ideally, action of this sort should be taken at an early U.S.-Russian presidential summit meeting, before Russia commits to new TNW production or deployments. It could, but would not necessarily need to be, part of a larger deal involving the issues of ABM Treaty modification and START III.

It also would be highly desirable, although much more difficult politically, to codify the existing declarations into a legally binding treaty, preferably with data exchange and verification provisions. Concerted efforts should be made to reach an early agreement on the initiation of negotiations on TNW reductions.

The two presidents could start by converting the existing texts of the relevant unilateral statements into a legally binding executive agreement and exchange at least basic data. They could also agree to begin negotiations on verification measures and/or

deeper reductions. Although verification of a TNW regime would be extremely complex, it should not be insurmountable and would be facilitated by the procedures already in place for the START, INF, and CFE treaties.

The goal of securing effective verification provisions should be especially attractive to the United States, which to date has had little success in promoting transparency with respect to Russian TNW. Russia, for its part, is likely to be wary of increased transparency, but under certain circumstances might be receptive to a legally binding accord because of the greater predictability it would afford. Of special interest to Moscow in this regard are the limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles and the preclusion of rapid US redeployments of TNW in Europe. These concerns were reportedly among the factors behind a bold proposal restricting sub-strategic nuclear forces that was prepared in the summer of 1991 by the Russian Foreign Ministry and endorsed by the General Staff, but preempted by President Bush's September 1991 unilateral declaration.

One can identify logical reasons why Russia should be interested in codifying the 1991 initiatives. Nevertheless, Russian concerns about a U.S./NATO advantage in conventional (and especially advanced conventional) forces, as well as fears in Moscow about further NATO enlargement and preparations by the United States for possible deployment of a National Missile Defense system, means that the impetus for strengthening the informal TNW regime will have to come from the United States. This initiative should be supported strongly by European allies of the United States who have the most to gain by reinforcing the existing regime and who should welcome, rather than fear, the consequences of greater transparency with respect to TNW.

### **Conclusion**

One should not underestimate the difficulty of implementing any of the aforementioned proposals. Recent international developments, however, demonstrate that the situation with respect to TNW is serious and requires immediate and concerted action. The United States should take the lead in devising and

promoting TNW arms control. To do so will require considerable political courage, creativity, and perseverance. To ignore the issue, however, is to accept the probability of the unraveling of one of the most successful disarmament accomplishments and the emergence of a new tactical nuclear arms race.

## Appendix

### *Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons Arsenal*<sup>8</sup>

Although the actual number of deployed Russian tactical nuclear weapons is not known, it is possible to estimate the range within which the actual number should be located. The term “deployed” means warheads kept at Air Force bases that are readily deployable on aircraft (warheads for all other delivery vehicles have either been eliminated or are kept at central storage facilities).

The “high end” of the estimate can be deduced from the share of the 1991 stockpile that should have remained after implementation of the 1991 initiatives (column 7 in Table One); this is the total of deployed and non-deployed warheads. The low end is the number of warheads that can be delivered by aircraft in a single launch (Table Three); the actual number should be higher because Russia may have more than one load of warheads per aircraft. The most likely number is based on the number of warheads subject to elimination due to expiration of warranty periods (column 3 in Table One).

Based on these calculations, the number of deployed TNW warheads in Russia should be between 2,500 and 8,400; most likely nearer the low end of this range.

**TABLE ONE**

Category	(1) Total in 1991	(2) Subject to elimination under 1991/92 initiatives	(3) Subject to elimination by 1997	(4) Share eliminated by January 1998	(5) Total Warheads by January 1998	(6) Share eliminated by the spring of 2000	(7) Total in the spring of 2000
Land-based missiles	4,000	4,000	4,000	80%	800	~100%	~0
Artillery shells	2,000	2,000	2,000	80%	400	~100%	~0
Mines	700	700	500	80%	140	~100%	~0
Air Defense	3,000	1,500	2,400	½ (100% implementation)	1,500	1/2	1,500
Air Force	7,000	3,500	6,000	½ (100% implementation)	3,500	1/2	3,500
Navy	5,000	2,000	3,000	1/3 (100% implementation)	3,400	1/3	3,400
Total	21,700	13,700	17,900		9,740		~8,400

Sources:

- (1), (2), and (3): Alexei Arbatov, "Sokrashchenie Nestrategicheskikh Yadernykh Vooruzhenii" (Reduction of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons), in Alexei Arbatov, ed., *Yadernye Vooruzheniya i Bezopasnost Rossii (Nuclear Weapons and Russia's Security)*, (Moscow: IMEMO, 1997), p. 56. The figures in (3) represent a combination of reductions required by the 1991/92 initiatives and those mandated by technical considerations (expiration of warranty).
- (4) Adapted from "Summary of Russian Delegation Paper at the Nuclear Experts Meeting at NATO on 25 February 1998". The figures represent the share of the 1991 totals (the totals themselves remained undisclosed).
- (5) Amounts calculated using columns (1) and (4).
- (6) Statement by H.E. Grigory Berdennikov at the 3d session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, May 10, 1999; National Report on the Implementation of the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty by the Russian Federation, April 25, 2000. Elimination of warheads for land-based missiles, artillery shells, and mines was defined as "nearing completion;" their numbers are therefore assumed to be close to zero.

(7) Calculated using columns (5) and (6). Figures for land-based missiles, artillery shells, and mines are and approximation derived from column (6). The total of 4,500 was probably reached by the end of 1999.

*Other estimates of Russian substrategic nuclear weapons:*

**TABLE TWO.**

Anatoli Dyakov's estimate of deployed and non-deployed warheads:

Category	(1) Total in 1991	(2) Deployed warheads in 1998	(3) Total stockpile in 1998
Land-based missiles		-0-	
Artillery shells		-0-	
Mines		-0-	
Air Defense		1,250	
Air Force		2,060	
Navy		2,400	
Total	17,100	5,710	8,560

Source: Anatoli Dyakov, *Sokrashchenie Yadernykh Vooruzhenii i Voprosy Transparentnosti* ("Reduction of Nuclear Weapons and the Transparency Issue"), report at a seminar at PIR Center, Moscow, October 8, 1998.

**TABLE THREE.** Estimates of deployed warheads by the Natural Resources Defense Council for 1998:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number</u>
ABM + Air Defense	1,200 (100 + 1,100)
Air Force (except Air Defense)	1,000
Navy	1,200
Total	3,400 (~4,000 in the NRDC table) (2,500)

Source:

William Arkin, Robert Norris, and Joshua Handler, *Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998* (Washington: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1998), p. 27.

Note: Apparently, the NRDC data includes 900 "extra" warheads. The 100 warheads for ABM missiles and 800 warheads for the Navy (SLCMs-presumably short range-and anti-submarine weapons) should have been either eliminated or transferred into the non-deployed category. According to the "Summary of Russian Delegation Paper at the Nuclear Experts Meeting at NATO on 25 February 1998" elimination of ABM and Air Defense warheads mandated by the 1991/92 initiatives has been completed, which should mean that the 100 warheads for the ABM missiles no longer exist. According to the Chief of the Navy Adm. Vladimir Kuroedov, there are no tactical nuclear weapons for surface ships and submarines on the Baltic or the Black Seas, including none on the naval bases; all of these are in central storage facilities. If all this is true, it would leave Russia with only 2,500 deployed warheads.

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## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Portions of this presentation draw upon William Potter and Nikolai Sokov, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: The Nature of the Problem," a paper prepared for a seminar on tactical nuclear weapons organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and held in Geneva, May 21-22, 2000.

<sup>2</sup> William Arkin, Robert Norris, and Joshua Handler, *Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Developments 1998* (Washington: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1998), p. 24.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, the Working Paper submitted by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway, complementary to the European Union Common Position for Subsidiary Body 1, NPT Review Conference, May 4, 2000.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Statement by H.E. Mr. Thorbjørn Jagland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2000 NPT Review Conference, New York, April 26, 2000.

<sup>5</sup> See Statement by Ambassador Filipe de Albuquerque, Delegation of Portugal, on Behalf of the European Union, Main Committee One, 2000 NPT Review Conference, New York, April 26, 2000.

<sup>6</sup> Notes for an Address by the Honorable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the North Atlantic Council Meeting, Florence, Italy, May 24, 2000.

<sup>7</sup> *Final Document, 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, New York, May 25, 2000.

<sup>8</sup> The tables in the Appendix were prepared by Dr. Nikolai Sokov of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

