

## CHAPTER 9

### **Russia and Arms Control for Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces**

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The question of whether Russian views and policies could present obstacles to arms control for non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) must be placed in the broader context of Russia's national security posture and competing views on the utility of nuclear weapons. This essay provides a brief overview of current debates in Russia on nuclear weapons before examining several factors that suggest that Moscow's interest in arms control arrangements affecting its NSNF is likely to be limited. Indeed, while Moscow has maintained its demands since the 1950s that all U.S. nuclear forces in Europe be removed, its willingness to retain existing arms control limits (such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and less formal obligations such as the 1991-1992 unilateral commitments on NSNF) may be in decline. The prospects of Moscow endorsing new negotiated constraints on Russian NSNF therefore appear doubtful.

#### **Three Current Debates on Nuclear Weapons in Russia**

At least three debates appear to be underway in Russia today about how much importance — and what roles — to assign to nuclear weapons. The first concerns the revolution in military affairs (RMA). The Russians generally agree that a revolution in military affairs based on information systems and precision-strike weapons is underway. Marshal Sergeev and others have warned that Russia may fall irretrievably behind in this competition. Part of the debate concerns to what extent nuclear weapons enable Russia to buy time, to hold its own while waiting for an economic recovery that would enable it to compete effectively. General Vladimir Slipchenko, among others, has argued that the current preoccupation with nuclear

weapons is leading Russia to focus on the last RMA rather than the new one.<sup>2</sup>

The second debate centers on the Kvashnin-Sergeyev power struggle over military policy, underway since 1997 and increasingly exposed to public view since July 2000. The Chief of the General Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, has been arguing for fairly radical cutbacks in strategic nuclear forces to support conventional force modernization; and he has been opposed by Marshal Sergeyev, the Defense Minister, with no clear and final outcome yet. Nikolai Sokov, one of the leading experts on Russia and nuclear weapons, has suggested that Kvashnin's victory would mean that it would be "highly unlikely that the increasingly popular plans to rely on tactical nuclear weapons vis-à-vis NATO conventional power" would be acted upon.<sup>3</sup>

It is possible, however, that Kvashnin has bureaucratic objectives in addition to — or perhaps even instead of — his substantive policy proposals. Mikhail Tsyarkin, an authority on decision-making in Russia's military establishment, has noted that the Russian Federation Security Council decisions in April 1999 to develop new NSNF went beyond the usual "conventional forces versus strategic nuclear forces" formulation of the Kvashnin-Sergeyev struggle, and may imply an advantage for Kvashnin: "The addition of tactical nuclear weapons to the conventional forces-strategic nuclear forces pairing possibly indicates that Sergeyev's doctrine has been found wanting."<sup>4</sup> Despite various signs of Kvashnin's probable ascendancy (including, for example, his popularity after the June 1999 Pristina airport episode, and the removal during the summer of 2000 of many of Sergeyev's supporters from the senior ranks of the military), the actual consequences of a Kvashnin victory are speculative.<sup>5</sup>

The third debate has been characterized as the "maximalist-minimalist" argument. Nikolai Sokov has used these terms to characterize a divide between the currently predominant support in Russia for high reliance on nuclear weapons, including non-strategic or operational-tactical nuclear weapons, and the minority that appears unenthusiastic about them. In Sokov's

words, “the ‘minimalists’ display a rather ambiguous attitude toward tactical nuclear weapons. They seem to avoid public statements on this subject and rarely offer ideas on how exactly they could be used... Caution is easy to explain by the domestic political situation in Russia, as well as the uncertainty in its international situation; the enlargement of NATO has significantly increased the perceived value of tactical nuclear weapons, and arguing against them is ‘politically incorrect,’ to use a popular American expression.”<sup>6</sup>

Why is arguing against non-strategic nuclear weapons “politically incorrect” in Russia today? What explains the evidently high level of support for NSNF? Conversely, why are the Russians likely to display only limited interest in arms control for NSNF?

#### **Four Reasons for Limited Interest in NSNF Arms Control**

At least four factors explain why Russian interest in arms control for NSNF may be limited in the foreseeable future. The first is Russia’s conventional military weakness. This weakness is largely a function of the country’s economic problems, which are unlikely to be overcome for many years. Russian authorities have asserted that the military is in a “transitional” period of high reliance on nuclear forces, pending an economic turnaround that will enable Russia to compete in non-nuclear military capabilities, particularly advanced RMA systems.<sup>7</sup> Marshal Sergeyev has tried to make a virtue of necessity in this regard. He has implied that going slow in the rebuilding of military strength could offer Moscow foreign policy advantages because a “sharp acceleration” of Russia’s military recovery “could be taken by other countries as a militarization.”<sup>8</sup>

The second factor is NATO’s conventional military superiority. In Russian eyes, the Atlantic Alliance’s military posture currently towers above other external security threats. As Alexei Arbatov, the vice chairman of the Defense Committee of the Duma, put it in a July 2000 paper, “During the next 10 years, in addition to holding a conventional superiority in Europe of approximately 2:1, or even 3:1, NATO will also possess a

substantial nuclear superiority in both tactical and strategic nuclear forces... However, due to the failures of Russian military reform from 1992-1997 and the chronic under-funding of Russian defense from 1997-1999 (in constant prices, during these 3 years, the military budget has fallen by 50 per cent), qualitative factors (training, combat readiness, command and control, troop morale, and technical sophistication of weapons and equipment, etc.) are presently even more favorable to NATO than pure numerical ratios might indicate.”<sup>9</sup>

The third reason looks beyond NATO’s capabilities to its perceived intentions. Russian officials have asserted that their country has grounds to fear NATO. As Defense Minister Sergeyev put it in an article in December 1999, “The fullest and most graphic significance of these threats to Russia’s national security manifested itself in the course of NATO’s expansion to the East and their aggression against Yugoslavia... From a military-political point of view, this war signified, in essence, the beginning of a new era of not just military, but also general history. An era of the open, military-force dictate of the U.S. in relation to other countries, to include its allies.”<sup>10</sup>

Since NATO conducted *Operation Allied Force* against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from March through June 1999, many Russians have speculated that Russia may become NATO’s next target. According to Arbatov, “For the first time since the mid-1980s, within operational departments of the General Staff and Armed Forces, the Security Council, and Foreign Ministry crisis management groups, and in closed sessions of the *Duma*, serious discussions took place concerning [potential] military conflict with NATO. All of a sudden the apocalyptic scenarios of a Third World War... which were presumed to have been permanently discarded with the end of the Cold War, returned to the table as practical policy making and military operational planning issues.”<sup>11</sup>

Since *Operation Allied Force*, NATO has been widely perceived in Russia as having a high propensity to use force. Russians have described nuclear weapons as the main instrument that could inhibit U.S. or NATO interference in regional conflicts

involving Russia — notably in Chechnya or elsewhere in the Caucasus, or in the Caspian Sea area.

The fourth reason for a low level of interest in NSNF arms control is that Russian military doctrine and policy assign several important functions to Russia's nuclear weapons and to NSNF in particular. Indeed, depending on how they are counted, at least nine functions for Russia's NSNF have been discussed in the professional Russian military literature in recent years, and these discussions seem to have become more intense since early 1999 — that is, since NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis.

The general functions for nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine are to deter aggression and, if that fails, to repel it. The most authoritative statements appear to be deliberately vague about the circumstances in which Russia might use nuclear weapons. In January 2000, the national security concept indicated that “The Russian Federation envisages the possibility of employing military force to ensure its national security based on the following principles: use of all available forces and assets, including nuclear weapons, in the event of need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective.”<sup>12</sup>

In April 2000, the new military doctrine stated that “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.”<sup>13</sup>

### **Nine Functions Attributed to Russia's NSNF**

Russian military authorities have in recent years attributed nine functions to the country's nuclear forces, including NSNF. Some of these functions and operational concepts are closely inter-related and overlap with others, but they all specify some type of utility.

The first is to deter external aggression. NATO has been explicitly named as a potential threat with nuclear relevance. “The presence and high level of combat readiness of nuclear weapons is the best guarantee that the U.S. and NATO will not try to establish their ‘order’ in our country as well, like the way it was done in Yugoslavia.”<sup>14</sup> Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov explained the function of the nuclear portions of the military doctrine as follows: “We are sending warning signals, as it were, in response to the moves by NATO and the USA today: don’t push us.”<sup>15</sup>

Russia is also concerned about deterring proliferants armed with non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD). According to Sergey Rogov, Director of the USA and Canada Institute, “Nuclear weapons also can deter the use of other weapons of mass destruction [WMD], including by nonnuclear-weapon countries.”<sup>16</sup> Three Russian military authors have looked beyond deterrence to operations: “Besides traditional deterrence of nuclear aggression through the threat of assured destruction, the use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts is envisaged as a means for actively countering the possible use of not only nuclear weapons, but also other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons.”<sup>17</sup>

The second function is to serve as an “equalizer” or “counter-balance” to the conventional force superiority of potential adversaries. That is, NSNF might compensate for Russia’s conventional military shortcomings so that Russia’s armed forces would not be defeated in combat. “Under certain conditions the most effective regional deterrence can be ensured by means which on the one hand would be powerful enough to inflict significant damage on the aggressor and thereby to carry out the real threat, and on the other hand not so powerful that the effect of self-deterrence and of their nonuse arises. Therefore the importance of nonstrategic nuclear forces for our defense grows objectively under present conditions... The presence of nonstrategic nuclear means of destruction in the RF [Russian Federation] Armed Forces permits restoring the disturbed balance of general-purpose forces under present conditions.”<sup>18</sup>

Some Russian analysts have acknowledged, however, that the utility of Russia's NSNF could be limited in contests with NATO or China. With regard to NATO, some Russian military writers have concluded, the Alliance's conventional military superiority might prove to be insurmountable: "It is clear that by the end of this phase, the aggressor's overall superiority in relation to the known laws of armed combat, could only increase. This also would apply to non-strategic nuclear forces... From this it inevitably follows that, starting from such a position of a 'controlled' exchange with the enemy with 'selective' nuclear strikes against military targets, while continuing to use conventional weapons, Russia's Armed Forces inevitably will lose in this phase."<sup>19</sup>

With regard to China, Beijing's ability to tolerate losses might neutralize a Russian strategy relying on NSNF: "If we look at a potential Russian-Chinese conflict from this aspect, we will have to give up the illusion that the threat of employing tactical nuclear weapons definitely is capable of deterring the opponent. A high readiness for sacrifices will allow the Chinese side to raise the stakes in this nuclear poker game."<sup>20</sup>

The third function is to help maintain the "combat stability" of forces engaged in an operation. According to Russian military authorities, "combat stability" enables forces to continue to conduct operations despite enemy actions. "Combat stability of troops (forces) is usually understood as their ability to accomplish the assigned missions under conditions of the enemy's counteraction."<sup>21</sup>

This concept seems at first glance to be similar to what Americans called "intra-war deterrence" during the Cold War. It should be noted, however, that Russian theorists see nuclear forces as simply contributing to "combat stability," not as furnishing it outright, and assign an even greater role in "combat stability" to conventional forces.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, some Russian conceptions of "combat stability" see strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces as mutually reinforcing.<sup>23</sup>

The fourth function of NSNF is to make possible the “de-escalation” of conventional conflicts. Rather than describing the use of nuclear weapons as a form of “escalation,” the customary metaphor in NATO countries, Russian military theorists suggest that Moscow’s NSNF use could provide for “de-escalation.” That is, Russian experts hypothesize that limited use of nuclear weapons would convince the adversary to reconsider his plans and to accept an end to the conflict without further combat. According to a 1999 article in the prominent journal *Military Thought*, “Fulfilling the de-escalation function is understood to mean actually using nuclear weapons both for showing resolve as well as for the immediate delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy. It is advisable to execute this mission using non-strategic (above all operational-tactical) nuclear weapons, which can preclude an ‘avalanching’ escalation of the use of nuclear weapons right up to an exchange of massed nuclear strikes delivered by strategic assets. It seems to us that cessation of military operations will be the most acceptable thing for the enemy in this case.”<sup>24</sup>

The uncertainties regarding escalation control and crisis management that were so prominent in NATO thinking about limited use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War are sometimes acknowledged by Russian military authorities,<sup>25</sup> as in the following example: “In the process of drawing up the nuclear deterrence plan, the question arises without fail about the aggressor’s response to the defending side’s limited use of tactical nuclear weapons and the expected results of an exchange of nuclear strikes. Therefore in the course of producing a decision, the need arises to assess expected results of nuclear strikes for each nuclear deterrence option *with consideration of enemy opposition.*”<sup>26</sup>

The closely related fifth function of NSNF is to make it possible for Russia to conduct limited nuclear strikes in a regional (or theater) war while avoiding an escalation to intercontinental nuclear operations or any other geographical extension of the conflict. Russian analysts have suggested, for example, that NSNF could be used “in the course of military operations...to compensate for enemy superiority on individual strategic

(operational) axes without crossing the ‘threshold of activation’ of strategic nuclear weapons, the massive use of which is fraught with mutual destruction of opposing sides and even with the disappearance of mankind.”<sup>27</sup>

The sixth function of Russia’s nuclear forces, including NSNF, is to inhibit the intervention of outside powers (such as the United States or NATO) in regional conflicts involving Russia. In a sense, this function amounts to a restatement of the first (deterrence of external aggression). Some Russians have nonetheless highlighted the imperative of ruling out any NATO intervention in the Chechnya conflict analogous to NATO’s actions in the Kosovo conflict: “Russia would make it clear that no one would be allowed to intervene in Russian domestic affairs. The West would be taught that Russia is not Yugoslavia. This is how Russia thinks today.”<sup>28</sup> (Incidentally, some Russians in late 1999 and early 2000 reported that “official representatives of the Defense Ministry” had been “hinting at the possibility of using low-yield tactical nuclear warheads in Chechnya.”<sup>29</sup> The speculation about possible use of NSNF in Chechnya led to Colonel-General Valeriy Manilov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, explicitly ruling it out in February 2000: “Naturally this can’t be used as the scale and the character of such a threat does not require the use of nuclear weapons.”<sup>30</sup>)

The seventh function of NSNF is to substitute for advanced long-range non-nuclear precision strike systems that, Russian authorities hold, “have begun to approach the role of nuclear weapons” in their significance.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, some Russian military experts hold that “Precision weapons are coming close to and in some cases even surpass tactical nuclear weapons in terms of target kill effectiveness. The conditional barrier which separated nuclear and conventional weapons for a long time essentially already has been demolished.”<sup>32</sup>

According to a Russian military analysis, “Modern day long-range, including non-nuclear, strike resources of the eventual enemy allow him to effectively accomplish a sufficiently wide range of offensive missions, including those like complete isolation of the theater of war, combating the second strategic

echelon, disorganizing and disrupting military production. Under these conditions, our natural argument in the battle for strategic initiative is still nuclear weaponry.”<sup>33</sup> Similarly, Alexei Arbatov has concluded that “development and deployment of sophisticated military capabilities, analogous to that of NATO’s massive, precision-guided, conventional air and naval potential, would for a long time be beyond Russia’s financial capacity. Therefore, the most probable Russian response, a response that is already taking shape, would be to place even greater emphasis on a robust nuclear deterrence, relying on enhanced strategic and tactical nuclear forces and their C3I systems.”<sup>34</sup>

The eighth function of NSNF is to constitute assets for the high command to change the correlation of forces in specific theaters or sectors of military operations. This evidently overlaps with the function of compensating for conventional military inferiority. “The presence of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russia’s Armed Forces provides an offset for the disruption of the balance of general-purpose forces, and their use in the course of military operations will nullify enemy superiority in particular strategic or operational sectors. A two-tier [strategic and non-strategic] system of nuclear deterrence increases the military security of the Russian Federation and enables a flexible response to changes in the military-strategic situation through the rational use of different components of nuclear forces in given situations.”<sup>35</sup>

The ninth function of NSNF is to compensate, at least to some extent, for reductions in Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. “Against the background of continuing reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, the role of forces equipped with operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons is increasing.”<sup>36</sup>

While the deterrence of external aggression stands out as the primary function of Russia’s nuclear forces, including NSNF, with “de-escalation” and other functions gaining greater relevance in war, various political roles have also been apparent. Moscow has relied on nuclear arms to uphold Russia’s status in international politics, to draw attention to Russia’s continuing

importance in Eurasia, and to serve as instruments for diplomatic gesticulation in crises. Russians have at times, for instance, sought to influence the decisions of other powers by pointing out that Moscow could withdraw from legal or political commitments affecting nuclear forces and/or re-deploy or reconfigure NSNF and other nuclear forces or even threaten nuclear strikes.

### **Other Indications of Utility for NSNF in Russia**

The relevance of published military doctrine and the professional military literature may be limited and scenario-dependent, but there are at least five other forms of evidence that show the Russians attach great (and perhaps growing) importance to NSNF.

#### *NATO-Russia Founding Act Negotiations*

The first resides in the Russian preoccupations during the 1996-1997 negotiations about the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which included the Alliance's commitments about military arrangements affecting the new Allies. The Russians insisted that NATO's December 1996 "three no's" commitment about nuclear weapons deployments on the territory of new allies ("no intention, no plan, and no reason" for such deployments) be supplemented in the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act by a "fourth no" excluding any NATO use of the former Warsaw Pact nuclear storage sites or any construction of new nuclear weapons storage facilities. The NATO allies therefore added that they had no need "to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy — and do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities."<sup>37</sup>

The Russian Foreign Minister during the Founding Act negotiations, Yevgeny Primakov, made clear in his memoirs that these were important points for Moscow. Primakov praised Malcolm Rifkind, the British Foreign Secretary, for

understanding during the negotiations “that Russia had a right to be concerned about the prospect of nuclear weapons being located closer to its borders.”<sup>38</sup>

This part of the Founding Act negotiations reveals that, despite the complete absence of any discernible interest in NATO in deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of new allies, Russia considered such NSNF deployments a genuine threat. This implies that the Russians may have attributed even more operational and political importance to NATO’s NSNF than did the NATO Allies themselves. If this was the predominant Russian view, it might have stemmed from the factors discussed earlier, including Russia’s conventional military weakness, and the many functions assigned to NSNF in Russian military analyses.

Some Russians have, moreover, expressed a lack of confidence in the enlargement-related military commitments in the Founding Act: “The Russia-NATO Founding Act includes the principle that NATO will refrain from deploying nuclear weapons and large military formations on the territory of new members. But no comforting illusions should be cherished on this score. In crisis situations the operational capabilities of NATO combined forces will be increased by the placing at their disposal of the military infrastructure of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Airfields, ports, arms depots and lines of communication will virtually make their territory a springboard for large-scale combat operations by the alliance against Russia. The bloc’s tactical aircraft may possibly be able to reach key civil and military-industrial targets in western Russia.”<sup>39</sup> This reference to NATO’s “tactical aircraft” could concern the Alliance’s conventional air capabilities, including precision-strike weapons, as well as its nuclear systems. The only U.S. NSNF remaining in NATO Europe are air-delivered weapons.

#### *Military Exercises*

The second form of evidence consists of exercises. The *Zapad 99* exercise in June 1999 was “the largest exercise since the creation of the Russian armed forces,” according to Defense Minister Sergeev.<sup>40</sup> *Zapad 99* assumed that NATO had

attacked the Kaliningrad oblast using forces and operational concepts similar to those it employed in *Operation Allied Force* against Yugoslavia. The Russian troops could not withstand NATO's offensive thrust with conventional means, so they used nuclear weapons "to 'repair' the situation. The simulated use of nuclear weapons included two Tu-95 [Bear] and two Tu-160 [Blackjack] heavy bombers launching nuclear ALCMs against Poland and the United States."<sup>41</sup> As Marshal Sergeyev put it, "The exercise tested one of the provisions of Russia's military doctrine concerning a possible use of nuclear weapons when all other measures are exhausted, including the use of conventional forces. We did pursue such an option. All measures were exhausted, our defense proved to be ineffective, an enemy continued to push into Russia and that's when the decision to use nuclear weapons was made."<sup>42</sup>

Subsequent exercises have reportedly also simulated the use of nuclear weapons — nuclear-armed cruise missiles launched from heavy bombers in a regional conflict. This circumstance underscores how artificial and arbitrary distinctions between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons can be. Although the professional military literature includes elaborate terminological discussions, with some authorities favoring the terms "theater nuclear weapons" and "operational-tactical nuclear weapons" instead of "tactical,"<sup>43</sup> the Russians evidently perceive no doctrinal obstacle to employing a nominally strategic weapon for a non-strategic (or theater or regional) mission.<sup>44</sup> It should be noted, however, that the Russians also report more extensive testing and employment in exercises of non-nuclear variations of air-launched cruise missiles that previously had only nuclear-armed versions on the Tu-95MS Bear H and Tu-160 Blackjack bombers.<sup>45</sup>

#### *NSNW Modernization*

The third form of evidence consists of laws and policy decisions relating to nuclear weapons and NSNF in particular. As Alexei Arbatov has pointed out, "on March 18, 1999 a new law, On Financing the Defense Contract for Strategic Nuclear Forces, was adopted by the Duma and approved by the President. . . . Of equal importance, this law emphasizes tactical nuclear forces as

the prime candidate for first use against a large conventional attack. The Iskander, a new, tactical ballistic missile . . . and a new, naval tactical nuclear weapons system were specifically discussed as nuclear options.”<sup>46</sup>

The next month, on 29 April 1999, the Security Council, chaired by Vladimir Putin, “decided to extend the service life of nuclear warheads for tactical delivery vehicles and, according to Putin’s briefing, discussed the concept for their use. A number of reports indicated that the Security Council decided to develop a new, low-yield nuclear warhead.”<sup>47</sup> According to Pavel Felgengauer, a well-informed journalist, “The program aims to make a limited nuclear war possible in theory. So that Russia can carry out precision low-yield ‘nonstrategic’ nuclear strikes anywhere in the world similarly to the way the United States is using cruise missiles and ‘smart bombs’ in Europe and Asia today...the new nuclear weapons’ main ‘appeal’ will be their ability to explode with an exceptionally low yield — from several tens of tonnes to 100 tonnes of TNT equivalent... It is being proposed to create up to 10,000 new low- and super-low-yield tactical nuclear weapons ‘to counter NATO expansion in Europe.’ . . . There is every indication that NATO’s strikes on Yugoslavia have helped the Ministry of Atomic Energy finally win official authorization to begin the practical implementation of its plans.”<sup>48</sup>

What systems would be equipped with the new warheads? While many reports have suggested that the new warheads might be fitted on the Iskander missile or fired from the 320mm howitzer, some analysts have offered a different hypothesis. In view of the 1991-92 commitments about tactical land-based systems, Nikolai Sokov has suggested, “these new warheads — if, indeed, a decision to develop them has been made — are intended for strategic delivery vehicles (such as heavy bombers and/or ICBMs), which would then become usable in regional conflicts.”<sup>49</sup>

Russian military analyses during and since NATO’s air campaign in the Kosovo conflict (March-June 1999) reveal a certain shift in preoccupations. Prior to NATO’s air campaign,

as during the negotiation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1996-1997, the Russians displayed a relatively high level of concern about the hypothetical (and in fact nonexistent) prospect of NATO NSNF being deployed on the soil of new NATO allies. Since NATO's air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, concern about U.S. and Allied long-range non-nuclear precision-strike capabilities has displaced, to some extent, concern about NATO's NSNF.

*Implementing the PNIs*

The fourth form of evidence consists of Russia's lack of transparency about the implementation of the 1991-1992 commitments to withdraw and eliminate certain types of NSNF. On the official level, the Russians avoid specifics about numbers and related issues. In April 2000, for example, Igor Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, said, "Russia also continues to consistently implement its unilateral initiatives related to tactical nuclear weapons. Such weapons have been completely removed from surface ships and multipurpose submarines, as well as from the land-based naval aircraft, and are stored at centralized storage facilities. One third of all nuclear munitions for the sea-based tactical missiles and naval aircraft has been eliminated. We are about to complete the destruction of nuclear warheads from tactical missiles, artillery shells and nuclear mines. We have destroyed half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and for nuclear gravity bombs."<sup>50</sup>

This statement, made at the NPT review conference in New York, was apparently no more informative than official Russian statements in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and in other forums. In May 1998 it was reported that "At a recent meeting to exchange information on tactical nuclear weapons, the Russian delegation's presentation was 'extremely fuzzy' and failed to provide any illumination on the fate of some 10,000 to 12,000 of its tactical nuclear weapons, according to NATO participants."<sup>51</sup> According to another account, "NATO officials said that they had hoped to learn how many [non-strategic] weapons the Russians still have and what safety procedures they use, but that the information presented by the Russians was extremely vague."<sup>52</sup>

According to a NATO press release about a NATO-Russia PJC meeting in October 2000, "NATO and Russia continued their reciprocal exchanges on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrine and strategy."<sup>53</sup> Published accounts suggest that this was the first PJC meeting to deal with nuclear weapons issues since April 1998. There are no indications, however, that the Russian delegation was more forthcoming about Russia's NSNF posture than the Russian Foreign Minister was at the United Nations in April 2000.

The estimates of numbers of Russian NSNF vary widely in Russian and Western published sources. In 1998 experts associated with the Natural Resources Defense Council estimated that Russia had 4,000 deployed NSNF warheads, plus perhaps 12,000 in reserve or awaiting dismantlement.<sup>54</sup> In 1998 Nikolai Sokov estimated that Russia had a total of 8,400 NSNF warheads.<sup>55</sup> According to a July 2000 paper by Alexei Arbatov, in "the early 1980s" the Soviet Union had "10,000 strategic and 30,000 tactical nuclear weapons," while currently Russia's "Nuclear forces consist of 5,000 strategic and approximately 2,000 tactical warheads (which due to serial obsolescence will be reduced to around 1,000-1,500 in the next 10 years)."<sup>56</sup>

Russia is believed to have made much less headway than the United States in dismantling NSNF in accordance with the 1991-1992 commitments, owing in part to resource limitations and the emphasis in U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction activities on dismantling strategic nuclear delivery systems, and probably also owing to convictions about the potential future utility of NSNF for Russia. In February 1997 Walter Slocombe, then the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, testified as follows: "While Russia pledged in 1991 to make significant cuts in its non-strategic nuclear forces and has reduced its operational NSNF substantially, it has made far less progress thus far than the US, and the Russian non-strategic arsenal (deployed and stockpiled) is probably about ten times as large as ours."<sup>57</sup> In March 1998, Edward Warner, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, repeated this estimate, adding that "Russian officials recently stated that the

1991-1992 NSNF pledges would be fully implemented by the year 2000, which would reduce the Russian advantage to about three or four to one.”<sup>58</sup> In February 1998, Alain Richard, the French Minister of Defense, said that Russia’s “stockpile of so-called tactical [nuclear] weapons...is estimated to be between 10,000 and 30,000 warheads, and we have only fragmentary information on their control.”<sup>59</sup>

The Alliance has repeatedly noted, as in December 1996, that “At a time when NATO has vastly reduced its nuclear forces, Russia still retains a large number of tactical nuclear weapons of all types. We call upon Russia to bring to completion the reductions in these forces announced in 1991 and 1992, and to further review its tactical nuclear weapons stockpile with a view towards making additional significant reductions.”<sup>60</sup>

There is little firm evidence, however, about what Russia has done to implement the 1991-1992 commitments. According to a 1997 report by the Congressional Research Service, “Russian officials contend that they have begun to dismantle warheads removed from these nonstrategic nuclear weapons and that they can do so at a rate of 2,000 warheads each year. The United States has little direct evidence to support Russia’s claims because U.S. officials have not observed the dismantlement process. Nevertheless, some have stated that Russia’s force of nonstrategic nuclear weapons may have declined by more than 25% from its peak of around 25,000 warheads in the late 1980s.”<sup>61</sup>

What do the Russian commitments amount to? In October 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev declared that “All nuclear artillery munitions and nuclear warheads for tactical missiles shall be eliminated. Nuclear warheads for air defense missiles shall be withdrawn from the troops and concentrated in central bases, and a portion of them shall be eliminated. All nuclear mines shall be eliminated. All tactical nuclear weapons shall be removed from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines. These weapons, as well as nuclear weapons on land-based naval aviation, shall be stored in central storage sites and a portion shall be eliminated.”<sup>62</sup>

In January 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin restated and slightly modified Gorbachev's commitment: "During the recent period, production has been stopped of nuclear warheads for land-based tactical missiles, and also production of nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines. Stocks of such nuclear devices will be eliminated. Russia is eliminating one-third of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and one-half of nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles. Measures in this direction have already been taken. We also intend to halve stocks of air-launched tactical nuclear munitions."<sup>63</sup>

Gorbachev and Yeltsin made similar commitments in that both promised to eliminate all nuclear artillery warheads, all warheads for land-based tactical missiles, and all nuclear mines. However, whereas Gorbachev said that "a portion" of the warheads for anti-aircraft missiles would be eliminated, Yeltsin said that "one-half" of them would be. Whereas Gorbachev said "a portion" of the warheads "from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines . . . as well as nuclear weapons on land-based naval aviation" would be eliminated, Yeltsin said "one-third of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons" would be eliminated. While introducing a vague precision regarding the Gorbachev-promised reductions in some weapons categories ("one-half" or "one-third" instead of "a portion"), Yeltsin offered an additional commitment that Gorbachev had not made: "to halve stocks of air-launched tactical nuclear munitions."

Gorbachev had proposed that "on the basis of reciprocity, it would be possible to withdraw from combat units on frontal (tactical) aviation, all nuclear weapons (gravity bombs and air-launched missiles) and place them in centralized storage bases."<sup>64</sup> In Yeltsin's version of this proposal, "The remaining tactical air-launched nuclear armaments could, on a reciprocal basis with the United States, be removed from combat units of the frontline tactical air force and placed in centralized storage bases."<sup>65</sup> Both versions of this proposal would have signified the elimination of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons presence in Europe — that is, the fulfillment of one of Moscow's goals since the 1950s. The United States had ruled out such an arrangement

from the outset. In his September 1991 speech that preceded the Soviet and Russian commitments, U.S. President George Bush said, “We will, of course, ensure that we preserve an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe. That is essential to NATO’s security.”<sup>66</sup>

It should be noted that Ivanov’s April 2000 statement amounts to an assertion that the commitments as formulated by Yeltsin have been almost completely fulfilled. The publicly articulated commitments do not, however, include any information exchanges, verification measures, baseline numbers, or legally binding deadlines. The deadlines (or goals) for the completion of the NSNF reductions reside not in the public statements by Gorbachev and Yeltsin in 1991 and 1992, but in clarifications furnished by Moscow in high-level bilateral and multilateral meetings. This circumstance explains the wording of the communiqué issued in December 2000 by NATO’s Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group: “We also recalled the drastic reductions of NATO’s nuclear forces in the new security environment, and renewed our call on Russia to complete the reductions in its non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile, as pledged in 1991 and 1992 for implementation by the end of the year 2000.”<sup>67</sup> Russia’s NSNF commitments (like those of the United States) remain, however, simply political declarations of intentions, not legally binding treaty commitments.

#### *The Future of Arms Control Agreements*

This circumstance brings us to the fifth form of evidence: recurrent discussions in Russia about possibly abandoning the 1991-1992 commitments, the INF Treaty, and the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), because they may conflict with Russia’s national security requirements.

Several published examples can be found of Russians suggesting that, under certain threatening international circumstances, Russia might have to abandon, modify or renegotiate the 1991-1992 commitments — including one by Igor Rodionov when he was Defense Minister in 1996,<sup>68</sup> and one by Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov, Chief of the Navy, in 1998.<sup>69</sup> In 1997, an

unattributed article in a Russian military journal indicated that the NSNF “regime” nominally created by the 1991-1992 commitments by Russia and the United States would eventually have to be replaced or modified: “With respect to the substance of the resolution, the longer it is put off, the more likely it will be resolved in favor of tactical nuclear weapons. This is connected with a change of generations at key posts in the military department. In this case the Russian side will undertake to revise unilateral obligations on tactical nuclear weapons, at the very least with respect to dates of their implementation.”<sup>70</sup>

According to Nikolai Sokov’s reading of the extensive Russian press coverage of the 29 April 1999 Security Council meeting devoted to nuclear weapons, it decided that “specific nuclear modernization decisions are postponed until the next year, 2000... This particularly concerns tactical nuclear weapons; in the year 2000 it will decide whether the 1991 informal regime limiting these weapons should be abandoned or not.”<sup>71</sup> Sokov has reported that “Russia may want to revise the 1991-92 regime by allowing naval tactical nuclear weapons, possibly at the expense of gravity bombs, although no formal proposal to that effect has been made.”<sup>72</sup> Russian interview sources suggest that there has been a fair amount of behind-the-scenes unofficial talk about abandoning the 1991-92 commitments, because gravity bombs are considered less useful than ground- and sea-launched missiles, among other non-strategic delivery systems.<sup>73</sup>

Foreign Minister Ivanov’s April 2000 statement should be recalled in this regard: “We are about to complete the destruction of nuclear warheads from tactical missiles, artillery shells and nuclear mines.” Even though, according to Ivanov, these types of nuclear weapons will soon be eliminated from the Russian armed forces, professional military discussions simply assert that “operational-tactical” nuclear strikes could be conducted by “missile troops” and “artillery,” as if the 1991-1992 commitments about such nuclear forces did not exist — or perhaps may not apply in future circumstances.<sup>74</sup> The Russian armed forces have evidently continued to train, exercise, and evaluate units to maintain their readiness to employ NSNF, even when the warheads have been placed in central storage facilities.

According to Rose Gottemoeller's interview with a Russian naval official, "Our captains are still judged by how well their sailors are trained to handle nuclear weapons, even though nuclear weapons are no longer carried day to day."<sup>75</sup>

Rather than assuming that the 1991-1992 commitments are a binding constraint on Russia's military options, Russian military analysts seem to ignore them. This pattern applies not only to NSNF nominally cut by "one-half" or "one-third," but also with regard to the nuclear mines, artillery, and tactical missiles that have ostensibly been nearly entirely eliminated. According to a 1999 article in *Military Thought*, "These operations will include nuclear strikes by missile troops, artillery and aviation and the use of nuclear landmines. . . . In accordance with the accepted classification of the scale of use of operational-tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear strikes are subdivided into single, multiple and massed."<sup>76</sup>

Some Russians have advocated that Russia withdraw from the INF Treaty or seek its renegotiation, because of Russia's changed geostrategic situation, including NATO enlargement. The argument goes beyond asserting that deploying ground-based IRBMs (prohibited by the treaty) would bring about — to quote a Russian author — "a radical change in psychology of the leadership of NATO countries with respect to ideas of bloc enlargement and so on. An important role can be played even by a serious discussion of the idea of rejecting the INF Treaty in different variations, from total withdrawal from the Treaty under the new geopolitical conditions to its modernization, allowing us to have intermediate-range missiles with the obligation of basing the restored ballistic missiles exclusively on RF [Russian Federation] territory."<sup>77</sup>

Although the INF Treaty originated as a U.S.-Soviet treaty, it has implications broader than that bilateral relationship. It obviously affects U.S. and Russian military options with regard to third parties. According to a Russian analysis, the INF Treaty "closes an opportunity for us to have such continental-class nuclear weapons which would reliably perform functions of ensuring Russia's security for the entire Eurasian spectrum of hypothetical

continental TVD's [theaters of military operations] (including Japan)."<sup>78</sup> It is reasonable to infer that "the entire Eurasian spectrum" also includes China. The artificiality of the "strategic" and "nonstrategic" categories is thus once again apparent in relation to the INF Treaty and potential Russian security requirements in East Asia. Rather than perceiving incentives for new NSNF arms control arrangements, some Russian analysts question the continued utility of the INF Treaty.

As for START I, this treaty prohibits the deployment of long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs on medium-range bombers.<sup>79</sup> Some Russian military analysts find this an unwelcome constraint on Russia's operational flexibility, because — to quote Nikolai Sokov's analysis of the Russian military literature on this point — "aircraft are versatile, being able to use both conventional and nuclear short-range missiles and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Even more important, even in a nuclear role they can be employed for substrategic missions, in line with the latest Military Doctrine, unlike the SRF [Strategic Rocket Forces] and the Navy."<sup>80</sup>

In short, in the current context some Russians — particularly in military circles — find existing nuclear arms control constraints irksome. It nonetheless seems unlikely that Russia will withdraw from these constraints in the foreseeable future. At least in the immediate future, Russia is likely to wait to see what decisions the United States makes about the ABM Treaty and other arms control agreements. Partly because of Russia's limited capacity to pursue new military programs, owing to its economic weakness, and the perceived advantages of letting the United States bear the political onus of withdrawing from (or seeking modifications in) the ABM Treaty and/or other arms control accords, Russia may be influenced to some extent by U.S. choices. In Sokov's judgement, "To a large extent, the choice for or against deployment of sea- and/or land-based tactical nuclear weapons will be determined by the overall legal context of nuclear arms reductions. If the trend toward unilateralism in this area obtains, then Russia will probably choose the second option, especially if it turns out to be more cost-effective. If Russia and the United States remain within the

bounds of arms control regimes, then a withdrawal from the 1991 regime will be unlikely.”<sup>81</sup>

In the meantime, the Russians have evidently become cautious about accepting new arms control obligations that could further constrain their NSNF options.<sup>82</sup> Moscow has always interpreted the 1992 Tashkent Treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on Collective Security as a collective defense pact, particularly in view of the mutual-defense obligation specified in Article 4.<sup>83</sup> Russia now interprets its obligation to defend its CIS allies as entailing a potential requirement to deploy nuclear weapons on their soil in certain circumstances. According to William Potter, “This policy shift, evident after April 1999, is apparent in quiet but effective Russian diplomacy to weaken the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty that is currently under negotiation.”<sup>84</sup>

### **Conclusion**

The point of this essay is not that the Russians have no incentives to pursue arms control for non-strategic nuclear forces, but that they have countervailing incentives to retain and improve their weapons in this category. It may therefore be difficult to engage them in successful negotiations affecting their NSNF — whether the goal is formalizing the 1991-92 commitments in a treaty and adding a verification regime,<sup>85</sup> or seeking further reductions in and/or the elimination of specific types of NSNF.

The incentives for the Russians to engage in arms control for NSNF extend beyond the usual theoretical advantages of arms control — transparency, predictability, stability, confidence-building, and so on. One of the chief Russian incentives to be interested in arms control for non-strategic nuclear forces no doubt remains one of the main goals of Moscow’s foreign policy since the 1950s: to get U.S. nuclear weapons out of Europe. Under Soviet and Russian rule, Moscow has made it clear in various negotiations — SALT, START, INF, etc. — that it regards the U.S. nuclear weapons presence as contrary to its interests. Russia has continued the Soviet tradition of arguing

for a unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. non-strategic nuclear force presence in Europe. In November 2000, Yuriy Kapralov, the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's department for security and disarmament, told a news conference that "The Russian initiative to radically reduce nuclear arsenals also stipulates negotiations on a pullout of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe."<sup>86</sup>

It is not clear that the United States and its allies will find a negotiation with Russia on NSNF in their interests. If such a negotiation took place, however, the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would constitute one of America's most important means of leverage in bargaining with Moscow. If the U.S. nuclear presence was withdrawn from Europe unilaterally, the Russians would have fewer incentives to accept any arms control measures, including a verification and transparency regime.<sup>87</sup>

Proposals for a unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear forces in Europe are sometimes associated with questionable assumptions. In April 2000, for example, William Potter and Nikolai Sokov argued that "it may be desirable for the United States to declare its intention unilaterally to return to U.S. territory all of its air-based TNW [tactical nuclear weapons] currently deployed in Europe. This pronouncement, which would lead to the elimination of all U.S. TNW in Europe, could go a long way toward dispelling Russian fears about NATO and could help to revive the spirit of the parallel 1991 initiatives."<sup>88</sup>

The extent to which this initiative would "go a long way toward dispelling Russian fears about NATO" might be limited, however, for Russia's greatest misgivings about the Alliance concern its enduring political cohesion; its demographic, economic, and military potential, including the large U.S. and still significant British and French strategic nuclear arsenals; its policies such as an "open door" regarding further enlargement; and its advanced non-nuclear strike capabilities and demonstrated effectiveness in employing them. Indeed, in an effort to infer a rational basis for such an initiative on NATO's part, Russian analysts might well conclude that their hypothesis

that U.S. and Allied non-nuclear precision strike systems are approaching (or exceeding) the effectiveness of nuclear weapons would be vindicated by the U.S. withdrawal of the remaining NSNF in Europe. The Russian fears about NATO might, in other words, remain virtually unchanged or perhaps even be deepened.

It is nonetheless plausible that the Russians would be pleased if the United States unilaterally withdrew its remaining NSNF from Europe if they interpreted it as a lessening of U.S. will and commitment, a decrease in NATO's political-military capabilities, and the elimination of the "coupling" and "transatlantic link" and other political-military functions of U.S. NSNF in Europe. The Russians and key observers in NATO Europe might consider the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear presence evidence of America's decreased willingness to defend its Allies with nuclear means. Moscow might then expect its European neighbors to become more deferential to Russia, in view of the perceived change in the balance of power and commitments, with unpredictable consequences. The withdrawal of U.S. NSNF could thus have counterproductive and even dangerous geopolitical consequences, because of the conclusions that could well be drawn in Russia and Europe about U.S. security commitments.

The risks and costs associated with a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. NSNF from Europe would therefore outweigh the putative gain of assuaging Russian anxieties and suspicions about NATO. Moscow's expressed fears are at any rate generally based on misperceptions and misrepresentations about NATO.<sup>89</sup> The withdrawal of the remaining U.S. NSNF could create an unstable situation in Europe by sending a message of U.S. disengagement and encouraging Russian great power aspirations and behavior. Unilateral withdrawal of U.S. NSNF would imply that Russian NSNF do not need to be balanced with even a minimum amount of comparable capabilities. This would be a huge misstatement about NATO's security interests and requirements. The Alliance would in effect be accepting Russian arguments that (despite NATO's conciliatory policies, non-aggressive record toward Russia, and structural need for laboriously achieved unanimity

among its 19 members for any operation other than self-defense) NATO is so inherently powerful via other means that it could give up U.S. NSNF in Europe — as if Russian perceptions of NATO as interventionist and hegemonic could only be diminished by this sacrifice of U.S. and Alliance capability and the severing of this transatlantic link.

Comparable problems burden other proposals for a withdrawal of U.S. NSNF. Lewis Dunn and Victor Alessi recently proposed that the United States withdraw its remaining NSNF from Europe in return for Moscow's agreement to "corral" its NSNF at central storage sites (thereby, it is argued, reducing the risk of diversion and narrowing Russian deployment and use options). Dunn and Alessi called for "coordinated unilateral actions" by Russia and the United States, rather than the purely unilateral U.S. action proposed by Potter and Sokov. However, one of the results would be the same: the elimination of the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe. As with the Potter-Sokov proposal, the Dunn-Alessi proposal is grounded in hopes that a U.S. NSNF withdrawal would elicit Russian restraint and transparency.<sup>90</sup> In practical terms, however, the U.S./Russian NSNF asymmetry in numbers would probably be magnified; reliable verification of the numbers of Russian NSNF inside (and outside) the "corrals" might well be impossible, especially in a crisis, when it would matter most; and NATO would have lost the political-military "coupling" and other security functions of U.S. NSNF in Europe.

Nor is it clear that a unilateral withdrawal of the remaining U.S. NSNF in Europe would, in the words of Potter and Sokov, "help to revive the spirit of the parallel 1991 initiatives." The spirit of the 1991-1992 initiatives was hopeful improvisation during a period of uncertainty and perceived urgency, in view of events in the Soviet Union and the difficulties in devising a formal NSNF arms control regime. In retrospect, Russians generally dismiss the hopefulness of the early 1990s regarding Russian cooperation with the United States and the West as a whole as "romantic" and "naive."<sup>91</sup> In the intervening period, Russian conventional forces have drastically deteriorated, and the utility of NSNF in Russian eyes has correspondingly mounted. It is therefore doubtful whether a unilateral removal of the remaining U.S.

NSNF in Europe would somehow “jump-start” negotiations with Russia about its NSNF.

It is far more likely that the Russians would simply “pocket” the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. NSNF as something they had always demanded. Under both Soviet and Russian rule, Moscow has considered the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe not simply threatening to its security, but politically illegitimate, a symbol of U.S. intrusion into Moscow’s rightful sphere of influence.<sup>92</sup> From a Russian perspective, the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe would be rectifying an old injustice and imposition, rather than offering a signal for Russian NSNF disarmament. For the Alliance, even if Russian NSNF numbers could thereby be numerically reduced, there would be little or no strategic gain. Russia would then hold a monopoly on NSNF from the Atlantic to the Chinese border. Moscow’s NSNF holdings would be unverifiable, but would probably remain in the thousands. If drastic reductions in NATO NSNF since 1991 have not led Moscow to resolve the massive uncertainties in the West about Russia’s NSNF, why should it be expected that complete withdrawal (entirely removing the Alliance’s leverage) would bring about a response that NATO could regard as satisfactory?

In other words, while the remaining U.S. NSNF in Europe constitute some of America’s most important means of bargaining leverage, their value in this regard is inescapably limited by Russia’s overriding national security priorities. To a significant extent, as indicated earlier, the Russians attribute utility to their NSNF for reasons other than NATO’s NSNF.<sup>93</sup> Russian interests in using NSNF to deter powers other than NATO (such as China), to substitute for advanced non-nuclear precision-strike systems, and to “de-escalate” regional conflicts (among other functions attributed to NSNF) would not be modified by a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. NSNF from Europe.

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## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> David S. Yost is a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. The views expressed are his alone and do not represent those of the Department of the Navy or any U.S. government agency. Special thanks are owed to those who commented on earlier drafts of this paper, though they naturally bear no responsibility for the views expressed: Bruce Ianacone, Rob Irvine, Jeff Larsen, Joseph Pilat, David Shilling, Bill Siegert, Nikolai Sokov, and Françoise Thom.

<sup>2</sup> “In this connection it should be noted that the RF Defense Council concept for RF Armed Forces reform and its option for optimizing the structure of branches and combat arms for the period up to 2005 clearly is directed toward the past war.” Major General Vladimir Ivanovich Slipchenko, *Future War* (Moscow: Moscow Social Science Foundation, Publishing Center for Scientific and Educational Programs, 1999), in FBIS, CEP20000313000001, p. 57 of translation.

<sup>3</sup> Nikolai Sokov, “‘Denuclearization’ of Russia’s Defense Policy? Debate in the Russian MOD Hints at Policy Reversal,” July 2000, available at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/denuke.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> Mikhail Tsypkin, “Military Reform and Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation,” *European Security*, Spring 2000, p. 37.

<sup>5</sup> For background, see Steven J. Main, “*It’s The Thought Process That First Went to War*,” ADVAB 1122 (Camberley, England: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, September 2000). This paper consists of a translation and extended analysis of an article published in *Krasnaya Zvezda* on 4 May 2000 by General Kvashnin and General M. Gareyev, the President of the Academy of Military Science. Ostensibly a discussion of the USSR’s strategic leadership during World War II, the article actually represents a salvo in the continuing Kvashin-Sergeyev struggle.

<sup>6</sup> Nikolai Sokov, *Russian Strategic Modernization: The Past and Future* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 180.

<sup>7</sup> “Nuclear equalizing of regional imbalances in conventional arms is for Russia just about the only possible, objectively forced measure for supporting the defense capability in the transitional period. Only overcoming the systemic crisis and achieving sufficiently steady paces of economic growth will allow us to place the emphasis on non-nuclear deterrence.” Colonel S.V. Kreydin, “Problems of Nuclear Deterrence: The Nuclear Potential’s Combat Stability,” *Voyennaya Mysl*, July-August 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000816000366.

<sup>8</sup> Igor Sergeyev, “The Main Factors which Determine Russia’s Military-Technical Policy on the Eve of the 21st Century,” *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 9 December 1999, in FBIS, CEP19991208000053.

<sup>9</sup> Alexei G. Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*, Marshall Center Paper no. 2 (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall Center, July 2000), pp. 5-6. The basis for Arbatov's reference to NATO's "substantial...superiority" in tactical nuclear forces is unclear. Arbatov himself attributes "approximately 2,000" NSNF warheads to Russia in this paper, and other sources (both Russian and Western) give much higher NSNF numbers for Russia. By comparison, unconfirmed published reports state that the number of remaining U.S. NSNF in Europe (gravity bombs for U.S. and allied aircraft) is in the range of 480 to 700. (For the lower number, see Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "U.S. Nuclear Weapon Locations, 1995," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November/December 1995, pp. 74-75; for the higher, see Alan Riding, "NATO Will Cut Atom Weapons for Aircraft Use," *New York Times*, 18 October 1991, p. A1.)

<sup>10</sup> Igor Sergeev, "The Main Factors which Determine Russia's Military-Technical Policy on the Eve of the 21st Century," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 9 December 1999, in FBIS, CEP19991208000053.

<sup>11</sup> Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>12</sup> Russia's National Security Concept, *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye*, 14 January 2000, in FBIS, FTS20000116000515.

<sup>13</sup> Russian Federation Military Doctrine, approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict of 21 April 2000, published in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 22 April 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000424000171, section I, par. 8.

<sup>14</sup> Major General Vladimir Grigoryev, Colonel Nikolay Radayev, and Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Protasov, "An 'Umbrella' Instead of a 'Shield' — Do Nuclear Weapons Have a Future?" *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, 1 February 2000, in FBIS, CEP 20000503000116.

<sup>15</sup> Radio interview with Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Russian Defense Ministry Directorate of International Cooperation, 8 February 2000, in FBIS, CEP 20000208000358.

<sup>16</sup> Sergey Rogov, "How Much Do Lost Illusions Cost? Russia Must Not Reject Nuclear Deterrence," *Vek*, 28 July 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000727000425.

<sup>17</sup> Colonel C.A. Ivasik, Colonel A. S. Pisyaukov, and Colonel A. L. Khryapin, "Nuclear Weapons and Russian Military Security," *Voyennoye Mysl*, July-August 1999, UKTRANS 00594.

<sup>18</sup> Vladimir Sivolob and Mikhail Sosnovskiy, "A Reality of Deterrence: Algorithms for Nuclear Weapon Use Should Become a Component

Part of Military Doctrine,” *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 22 October 1999, in FBIS, CEP 19991029000006.

<sup>19</sup> Lieutenant Colonel E.N. Akhmerov, Colonel N.F. Kravchenko, and Colonel I.I. Sobchenko, “On the Direction of Regional Nuclear Deterrence,” *Voyennaya Mysl*, July-August 2000, in FBIS, CEP 20000816000369. These authors suggest that Russia could nonetheless achieve a stalemate without further escalation owing to NATO’s “heightened sensitivity to losses.” The authors conclude that conventional force improvements “would be much more expedient” than NSNF modernization.

<sup>20</sup> Andrey Piontkovskiy and Vitaliy Tsygichko, “A Holey Nuclear Umbrella,” *Segodnya*, 31 May 2000, in FBIS, CEP 20000531000257.

<sup>21</sup> Colonel S.V. Kreydin, “Problems of Nuclear Deterrence: The Nuclear Potential’s Combat Stability,” *Voyennaya Mysl*, July-August 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000816000366.

<sup>22</sup> “In contrast to ‘survivability,’ ‘combat stability’ is ensured not only and not so much by the nuclear forces themselves, as much as by the Armed Forces as a whole and by the general purpose forces in particular.” Colonel S.V. Kreydin, “Problems of Nuclear Deterrence: The Nuclear Potential’s Combat Stability,” *Voyennaya Mysl*, July-August 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000816000366.

<sup>23</sup> “What should the required level of nuclear escalation of defense be to guarantee its strategic stability? Would operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weaponry be sufficient, or would more powerful reserves of strategic nuclear forces be required? The dialectics here are such that nuclear resources in the TVD (operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons) would support the combat stability of the strategic nuclear forces, and if needed, the latter could support the former in the interests of supporting their own combat stability.” Colonel S.V. Kreydin, “Problems of Nuclear Deterrence: The Nuclear Potential’s Combat Stability,” *Voyennaya Mysl*, July-August 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000816000366.

<sup>24</sup> Major General V. I. Levshin, Colonel A.V. Nedelin, and Colonel M. Ye. Sosnovskiy, “Use of Nuclear Weapons To De-escalate Military Operations,” *Voyennaya Mysl*, May-June 1999, in FBIS, FTS19990602001557.

<sup>25</sup> For background, see David S. Yost, “The History of NATO Theater Nuclear Force Policy: Key Findings from the Sandia Conference,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 15 (June 1992).

<sup>26</sup> Lt. Gen. P. I. Dubok and Colonel N.A. Zakaldayev, “On Some Issues of Command and Control of Missile Troops and Artillery in Accomplishing Regional Nuclear Deterrence,” *Voyennaya Mysl*,

November-December 1999, in FBIS, CEP19991210000001; emphasis in the original.

<sup>27</sup> Vladimir Sivolob and Mikhail Sosnovskiy, "A Reality of Deterrence: Algorithms for Nuclear Weapon Use Should Become a Component Part of Military Doctrine," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 22 October 1999, in FBIS, CEP 19991029000006.

<sup>28</sup> Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*, p. 21.

<sup>29</sup> Viktor Sokirko, "The Face of National Security. Russia to Provide Itself with New Military Doctrine in the Next Few Days," *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 27 January 2000, in FBIS, FTS20000127000926. See also Andrei Piontkowsky, "Russia Goes Nuclear over Chechnya," *PRISM: A Biweekly on the Post-Soviet States*, vol. 5, issue 17 (24 September 1999).

<sup>30</sup> Colonel-General Valeriy Manilov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, televised interview on 5 February 2000, in FBIS, FTS20000205000260.

<sup>31</sup> "In this way, the main distinctive feature of the new phase of the revolution in military affairs lies in the sharp increase in the effectiveness of traditional [armaments] and the appearance of principally new types of non-nuclear armaments, to include those based on new physical principles. As a result, their role in the overall system of intergovernmental relations, as the events in the Balkans showed, in their significance have begun to approach the role of nuclear weapons." Igor Sergeev, "The Main Factors which Determine Russia's Military-Technical Policy on the Eve of the 21st Century," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 9 December 1999, in FBIS, CEP19991208000053.

<sup>32</sup> Major General Vladimir Ivanovich Slipchenko, *Future War* (Moscow: Moscow Social Science Foundation, Publishing Center for Scientific and Educational Programs, 1999), in FBIS, CEP20000313000001, p. 11 of translation.

<sup>33</sup> Colonel S.V. Kreydin, "Problems of Nuclear Deterrence: The Nuclear Potential's Combat Stability," *Voyennaya Mysl*, July-August 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000816000366.

<sup>34</sup> Alexei G. Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*, Marshall Center Paper no. 2 (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall Center, July 2000), p. 17.

<sup>35</sup> Ivasik.

<sup>36</sup> Ivasik.

<sup>37</sup> Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation, signed at Paris, 27 May 1997, p. 7.

<sup>38</sup> Yevgeny Primakov, *Years in Big Politics*, translated and abridged by J. B.K. Lough, report F70 (Camberley, England: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2000), pp. 4, 13.

<sup>39</sup> Colonel Andrey Kulakov, "Russia: NATO's Geopolitical Ambitions," *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, November 1998, published in English as Andrey Kulakov, *NATO's Geopolitical Ambitions*, UK Translation 591 (Camberley, England: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, November 1998), pp. 2-3.

<sup>40</sup> Press Conference with Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeev, 9 July 1999, transcript by Federal News Service, Inc., p. 1.

<sup>41</sup> Nikolai Sokov, *Russian Strategic Modernization: The Past and Future* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 171.

<sup>42</sup> Press Conference with Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeev, 9 July 1999, transcript by Federal News Service, Inc., p. 3.

<sup>43</sup> "In our view, use of the term 'tactical nuclear weapons' is illegitimate, inasmuch as it describes only one (and not the most important) aspect of employment — range of delivery of the nuclear warhead." Major General V. I. Levshin, Colonel A.V. Nedelin, and Colonel M. Ye. Sosnovskiy, "Use of Nuclear Weapons To De-escalate Military Operations," *Voyennaya Mysl*, May-June 1999, in FBIS, FTS19990602001557.

<sup>44</sup> For that matter, Western nuclear powers evidently also perceive few doctrinal obstacles in the nominal designations of particular weapons. Britain has assigned "strategic" and "sub-strategic" roles to its Trident SLBMs. France has since 1991 placed all its nuclear-armed aircraft previously given "prestrategic" designations under the command of the Strategic Air Forces (*Forces Aériennes Stratégiques*). U.S. B-61 bomb types have been considered both "strategic" and "non-strategic," depending on their mission and configuration.

<sup>45</sup> Piotr Butowski, "Russia's Strategic Bomber Fleet Achieves New Heights," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 1 March 2000; and "Tactical Exercises Held to Prepare Strategic Aircraft for Use in Regional Conflicts," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 21 April 2000, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 May 2000.

<sup>46</sup> Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*, pp. 17-18.

<sup>47</sup> Nikolai Sokov, "Overview: The April 1999 Russian Federation Security Council Meeting on Nuclear Weapons," 29 June 1999, NIS Nuclear Profiles Database, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

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- <sup>48</sup> Pavel Felgengauer, "Limited Nuclear War? Why Not! Russia's New Defense Concept Could Include Precision Use of Nuclear Weapons," *Segodnya*, 6 May 1999, in FBIS, FTS 19990506000851.
- <sup>49</sup> Nikolai Sokov, "Overview: The April 1999 Russian Federation Security Council Meeting on Nuclear Weapons," 29 June 1999, NIS Nuclear Profiles Database, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.
- <sup>50</sup> Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Minister, statement at NPT Review Conference, New York, 25 April 2000; text available at [www.basicint.org/nuclear/revcon2000/nuk\\_00revcon\\_gen\\_russia.htm](http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/revcon2000/nuk_00revcon_gen_russia.htm).
- <sup>51</sup> William Drozdiak, "The Next Step for NATO: Handling Russia," *Washington Post National Weekly*, 11 May 1998, p. 15.
- <sup>52</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "Uneasy Friendship: Expanding NATO Courts Russia," *New York Times*, 28 May 1998, p. A12.
- <sup>53</sup> Press Statement, PJC Ambassadorial Meeting, 30 October 2000, available at [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int).
- <sup>54</sup> W. M. Arkin, R. S. Norris, and J. Handler, *Taking Stock — Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998* (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1998), p. 27, cited in Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, "Appendix: Types, Carriers and Locations of Tactical Nuclear Weapons," in Patricia Lewis, ed., *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Preliminary Research Findings* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, April 2000), p. 33.
- <sup>55</sup> Nikolai Sokov, "Estimate of Total Russian (Non-deployed) Substrategic Nuclear Weapons," Appendix of William C. Potter, "Update on Developments Regarding Tactical Nuclear Weapons Disarmament," Presentation to the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, New York, 28-30 June 1999, cited in Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, "Appendix: Types, Carriers and Locations of Tactical Nuclear Weapons," in Patricia Lewis, ed., *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Preliminary Research Findings* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, April 2000), p. 33.
- <sup>56</sup> Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*, pp. 4-5.
- <sup>57</sup> Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, statement before the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, Hearing on Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence, 12 February 1997, p. 4 of text furnished by the Department of Defense.
- <sup>58</sup> Edward L. Warner III, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Threat Reduction), statement before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Nuclear

Deterrence, 31 March 1998, p. 4 of the text furnished by the Department of Defense.

<sup>59</sup> Alain Richard, Minister of Defense, speech at the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale, 10 February 1998, p. 5 of text furnished by the French Ministry of Defense. The high number given by M. Richard for Russian NSNF is exceptionally elevated. In 1997, when Senator Bertrand Delanoë sought a statement from the French Ministry of Defense on this subject, he declared in his question that there were 22,000 Russian tactical nuclear warheads, but the Ministry of Defense declined to confirm that number. The French Ministry of Defense made the following statement: “The return of the tactical nuclear weapons to the territory of the Russian Federation was apparently completed in 1992. Nonetheless, the information available does not permit us to affirm that these weapons were really destroyed. Moreover, the future of tactical nuclear weapons is not governed by any juridically constraining international agreement. Only the simultaneous declarations of the President of the United States and of the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party in 1991 mention the idea of a progressive dismantlement of these weapons. Finally, the proportion of deployed warheads in relation to those that are stockpiled or awaiting dismantlement cannot be determined with any precision.” *Journal Officiel de la République Française, Sénat*, 2 May 1997, pp. 1368-1369.

<sup>60</sup> Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meetings of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, 17 December 1996, par. 9.

<sup>61</sup> Amy F. Woolf and Kara Wilson, *Russia's Nuclear Forces: Doctrine and Force Structure Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 23 May 1997), p. 9. The source for the “some have stated” observation is given as follows: “Russian Defense Budget Continues Downward Spiral, Says CIA, DIA,” *Arms Control Today*, vol. 24, September 1994, p. 27.

<sup>62</sup> Televised announcement by Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 5 October 1991, U.S. State Department translation in *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (London: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1992), p. 87.

<sup>63</sup> Televised statement by Russian Federation President Boris N. Yeltsin, 29 January 1992, FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) translation in *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (London: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1992), p. 90.

<sup>64</sup> Televised announcement by Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 5 October 1991, U.S. State Department translation in *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (London: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1992), p. 87.

<sup>65</sup> Televised statement by Russian Federation President Boris N. Yeltsin, 29 January 1992, FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) translation in *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (London: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1992), p. 90.

<sup>66</sup> George Bush, "Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons," 27 September 1991, in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 27, no. 39, 30 September 1991, pp. 1349-1350.

<sup>67</sup> Final communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, December 5, 2000, para. 10.

<sup>68</sup> "Rodionov declared that in the face of NATO enlargement, Russia 'might objectively face the task of increasing the number of tactical nuclear weapons at [its] borders.'" Nikolai Sokov, *Russian Strategic Modernization: The Past and Future* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 180. Sokov cites the following source: Igor Rodionov, "Kakaya Oborona Nuzhna Rossii," *Oborona I Bezopasnost* 143 (2 December 1996), p. 4. It is, of course, possible that Rodionov had in mind a geographical redistribution (hence an increase in deployments near certain borders) in NSNF covered by the 1991-1992 commitments rather than any deviation from the rather vaguely worded commitments.

<sup>69</sup> Kuroedov quoted in *Russki Telegraph*, 11 June 1998, cited in Nikolai Sokov, "The Fate of Russian Nuclear Weapons: An Anticlimax on August 11," 14 August 2000, available at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/denuke2.htm>. Kuroedov advocated returning non-strategic nuclear weapons to surface ships and submarines under "threatening international circumstances." See also Sokov, *Russian Strategic Modernization: The Past and Future* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp. 170-171.

<sup>70</sup> "Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Russia," *Voprosy Bezopasnosti*, December 1997, in FBIS, FTS19980226000574.

<sup>71</sup> Nikolai Sokov, *Russian Strategic Modernization: The Past and Future* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 164.

<sup>72</sup> Nikolai Sokov, "The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Controversy," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 31 January 2001.

<sup>73</sup> Other examples of Russians talking about possibly abandoning the 1991-1992 commitments have two characteristics: the context concerns developments deemed threatening to Russia, such as NATO enlargement or U.S. security cooperation with the Baltic states; and the abandonment of the commitments is usually implicit in the call for a buildup and/or more extensive deployment of NSNF. See, for example, Vladimir Belous, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Half-Forgotten Reality," *Segodnya*, 23 June 1995, cited in Nikolai Sokov, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination: Next Step for Arms Control," *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1997); Alexander Lyasko, "Although the Doctrine is New, It Resembles the Old One," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 29 September 1995, p. 2, translation furnished by the Conflict Studies Research Centre; Pavel Felgengauer, "Russian Generals Aren't Interested in NATO Countries' Good Intentions," *Segodnya*, 23 June 1996, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, 19 July 1996, p. 31; and "More Rigid Nuclear Policy Seen as Russia's Possible Reaction to U.S.-Baltic Charter," Baltic News Service, 16 January 1998. Anton Surikov, a close associate of Russian Communist party leaders, argued in 1995 for "restraining NATO with nuclear weapons" deployments in Belarus, Kaliningrad, Crimea, Abkhazia, Georgia, and Armenia and on ships in the Baltic, Black, and Barents Seas. Anton Surikov, Defense Research Institute, *Special Institute Staff Suggests Russia Oppose NATO and the USA*, October 1995, ADVAB 1017 (Sandhurst, England: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, April 1996), pp. 3, 5-7. This is a translation of the widely discussed article in *Segodnya* on 20 October 1995.

<sup>74</sup> It has been reported that Russian NSNF were recently moved to Kaliningrad. The Russian government has disputed the accuracy of such reports. See, among other sources, Bill Gertz, "Russia Transfers Nuclear Arms to Baltics," *Washington Times*, 3 January 2001, p. 1; and Bill Gertz, "Poland Wants Inspections in Kaliningrad," *Washington Times*, 5 January 2001, p. 1.

<sup>75</sup> Rose Gottemoeller, "Lopsided Arms Control," *Washington Post*, 7 December 2000, p. 37.

<sup>76</sup> Major General V. I. Levshin, Colonel A.V. Nedelin, and Colonel M. Ye. Sosnovskiy, "Use of Nuclear Weapons To De-escalate Military Operations," *Voyennaya Mysl*, May-June 1999, in FBIS, FTS19990602001557.

<sup>77</sup> Sergey T. Brezkun, "Pioners must be revived: Russia needs a new 'European' nuclear weapon," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 13

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August 1999, in FBIS, 18 August 1999, FTS 19990818001156.  
“Pioneer” is a Russian designation for a certain type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).

<sup>78</sup> Brezkun, *ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> Under START I a medium-range bomber equipped with a long-range nuclear-armed ALCM becomes accountable as a heavy bomber. For START purposes, a long-range nuclear-armed ALCM has a range in excess of 600 km.

<sup>80</sup> Nikolai Sokov, “A New Old Direction in Russia’s Nuclear Policy,” *Disarmament Diplomacy*, no. 50 (September 2000).

<sup>81</sup> Nikolai Sokov, “The Fate of Russian Nuclear Weapons: An Anticlimax on August 11,” 14 August 2000, available at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/denuke2.htm>.

<sup>82</sup> At the March 1997 US-Russian summit in Helsinki, President Clinton and President Yeltsin “agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence-building and transparency measures.” The reference to “appropriate confidence-building and transparency measures” implies that either Russia or the United States (or both) may not be prepared to accept an intrusive verification regime for such systems. The future of the START process, including START III, is uncertain at the current juncture.

<sup>83</sup> Andrei Zagorski, “Regional Structures of Security Policy within the CIS,” in Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth, eds., *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), p. 285.

<sup>84</sup> William C. Potter, “Reducing the Threat of Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” paper for the International Workshop on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Tokyo, 27-29 August 2000, p. 5.

<sup>85</sup> In December 2000 the North Atlantic Council called for “an early conclusion of a START III agreement” and stated that, “Given the need to reduce the uncertainties surrounding substrategic nuclear weapons in Russia, we believe that a reaffirmation — and perhaps codification — of the 1991/92 Presidential Initiatives might be a first, but not exhaustive, step in this direction.” Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 15 December 2000, par. 63. The North Atlantic Council also approved a proposal for “a reciprocal data exchange with Russia” in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council “to enhance transparency and knowledge of the size of the U.S. and Russian stockpiles” of “sub-strategic nuclear forces.” See

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the Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament (Brussels: NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2000) 121, 14 December 2000), par. 95.

<sup>86</sup> Kapralov statement of 14 November 2000, quoted in Itar-Tass dispatch, 14 November 2000, in FBIS, CEP20001114000223.

<sup>87</sup> This essay is focused on Russian attitudes and policies, rather than the intrinsic problems of defining an arms control regime for NSNF, such as the baseline or initialization problem and the difficulties of verification and geographical scope. Nor does this essay examine the considerable damage to U.S. and NATO interests, including with respect to nonproliferation, that could be caused by a unilateral withdrawal of the remaining U.S. nuclear presence in Europe. For a discussion of these issues, see David S. Yost, *The US and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe*, Adelphi Paper no. 326 (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1999), pp. 25-33, 49-52, and 57-61.

<sup>88</sup> William C. Potter and Nikolai Sokov, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: The Nature of the Problem," in Patricia Lewis, ed., *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Preliminary Research Findings* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, April 2000), p. 26.

<sup>89</sup> Some European experts on Russia judge that Moscow at times overstates its concerns about NATO to advance domestic political purposes and to seek concessions from European and NATO nations.

<sup>90</sup> According to Dunn and Alessi, "Russian readiness to consolidate its tactical-nuclear-weapons holdings is far from certain. . . . But realistically, there would be little Russian incentive to take this step unless the United States were prepared to withdraw its residual tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. The Russians might calculate that the political and military benefits of US withdrawals compensated for reduced Russian military flexibility. Not least, withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe would lessen concerns of Russian conservatives that NATO enlargement will eventually lead to nuclear deployments on the territory of former Warsaw Pact members." Lewis A. Dunn and Victor Alessi, "Arms Control By Other Means," *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 4 (Winter 2000-2001), p. 136.

<sup>91</sup> Vladimir Shlapentokh, "'Old,' 'New' and 'Post' Liberal Attitudes Toward the West: From Love to Hate," a paper published in August 1998 by the Special Adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs, NATO Secretariat.

<sup>92</sup> In this respect the attitudes of many Russians in the country's political elite remain as a renowned British scholar characterized them during the Soviet period: "The Russians feel themselves to be not only

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the most numerous but also the greatest of all European peoples. They believe, on these grounds and on ideological grounds, that the Soviet Union has the right to greater influence in all European affairs than she has now." Malcolm Mackintosh, "Moscow's View of the Balance of Power," *The World Today*, vol. 29 (March 1973), p. 111.

<sup>93</sup> As Nikolai Sokov himself has pointed out, "The persistence with which Russia continues to adhere to the view that tactical nuclear weapons are important for its security in spite of several years of insistence of the West that these weapons should be reduced, testifies to the relative independence of the country's policy in the area of nuclear weapons." Nikolai Sokov, *Russian Strategic Modernization: The Past and Future* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 200. Indeed, Sokov has commented as follows on proposals to convert the 1991-1992 commitments into a formal treaty regime, with verification provisions: "The task is not easy. Russia values tactical nuclear weapons more than the Soviet Union did in 1991 and its requirements for such a treaty are stiffer." Nikolai Sokov, "The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Controversy," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 31 January 2001.